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Myopic Reactions to Performance Feedback: 
Different Decision Makers, Different Decisions 
 
Abstract 
The behavioral theory of the firm predicts that problemistic search and organizational change occurs 
after comparing performance with the aspiration level, and this prediction has been strongly 
supported. The bounded rationality assumption in the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that such 
search is often myopic. However, we still lack theory explaining the source of myopia and how 
myopia influences decision makers choosing search directions when performance feedback indicates 
a problem. In this study, we address the relationship between myopia and search direction. We 
develop theory on how decision maker cognitions and knowledge formed by their past experiences 
underlie coalitions that direct myopic search, leading to connections between the decision making 
group composition and the likelihood of choosing different actions when making organizational 
changes. We apply the theory to a well-known reaction to performance feedback—mergers and 
acquisitions—and show that the experience of the decision maker and the composition of the key 
decision making group—board of directors—interacts with performance feedback to affect the 
choice of action—the type of acquisition target—as an outcome of myopic search.  
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Introduction 
“A Behavioral Theory of the Firm” (Cyert and March 1963) introduced the model of 
problemistic search, which posits that organizations search for solutions when performance below an 
aspiration level indicates a problem. This search is initially myopic, or near the organizational unit 
indicating low performance, but becomes broader if satisfactory solutions cannot be found or do not 
work. A central theoretical contribution was the shift in focus from rational consideration of problems 
and opportunities to problem-driven search. A central empirical contribution has been the 
accumulation of studies showing that organizational changes are indeed driven by performance 
below the aspiration level (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal and Ocasio 2012; Shinkle 2012). The progress 
of such performance feedback research has been impressive, as it predicts outcomes such as product 
introduction (Gaba and Joseph 2013), innovations (Greve 2003a), market expansion (Barreto 2012), 
alliance partner choice (Shipilov, Li and Greve 2011), mergers and acquisitions (Iyer and Miller 
2008), divestiture (Desai 2016), and risk taking (Kacperczyk, Beckman and Moliterno 2015).  
However, the sheer diversity of outcomes modeled in empirical work has revealed a gap in the 
theory. Each study examines a specific domain and makes predictions on whether performance 
below aspiration will lead the firm to change in that domain, but not on how firms choose among 
alternative actions in that domain. Thus, scholars have predicted whether and when firms make a 
change, but not what action is chosen in the respective change. For example, performance feedback 
affects divestment (Desai 2016; Shimizu 2007), and it would be of interest to not only examine when 
organizations choose divestment, but also to explore which business segment they choose to divest. 
Such examination requires theory of myopic search, which is already in the behavioral theory of the 
firm, but it has not been sufficiently developed and applied in research so far. The lack of a prediction 
on actions chosen also originates from a gap between theory and empirical work, as the current 
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theory of myopic search resulting from low performance has been difficult to operationalize. The 
most common performance measure is return on assets (ROA) (Shinkle 2012), which is a powerful 
driver of change because it is tracked both by CEOs and by stakeholders such as stock analysts and 
investors. However, ROA summarizes the performance of the entire organization, so its scope is too 
wide to be a source of myopia, making it insufficient to predict the search direction and action 
chosen. Thus the theory lacks a mechanism to predict how myopia affects decision-making after 
performance has indicated a need for change. 
 One potential solution lies in recognizing that myopia can stem from the cognition and 
knowledge of managers, as shown by research on managerial cognitions and strategic groups 
(Kaplan 2011; Porac et al. 1995). There is evidence that managerial cognition stemming from their 
characteristics and experiences guides strategic changes (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Hambrick and 
Mason 1984; Jensen and Zajac 2004; Walsh 1988), though the evidence is currently stronger on 
CEOs (Bigley and Wiersema 2002; Crossland, Jinyong, Hiller and Hambrick 2014; Nadkarni and 
Chen 2014; Zhu and Westphal 2014). However, what is not sufficiently explained is how the 
individual managerial experience and their myopic cognitions aggregate to influence firm-level 
decisions, especially when performance feedback indicates a need for change (e.g., Eggers and 
Kaplan 2009; Gerstner, König, Enders and Hambrick 2013). Thus, the two literatures have 
symmetric gaps, with cognition missing from performance feedback research and problemistic 
search missing from managerial cognition research. The bridge across this gap between managerial 
cognition research and problemistic search is to use the theory of coalition building (Cyert and 
March 1963), taking decision-maker cognitions as the building blocks of potential coalitions and 
performance feedback as activating coalition building to direct search and choose among 
alternative actions. 
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We thus have an opportunity to contribute by developing theory specifying a joint effect of 
performance feedback and decision-making group composition on the action chosen, as a result of 
decision-maker cognitions and coalition building directing myopic search triggered by performance 
feedback. We combine three theoretical mechanisms: (1) search is triggered by comparison of 
performance and the aspiration level; (2) cognitions shaped by decision-maker experience influence 
the myopia of search; and (3) decision-makers form groups based on the similarity of their individual 
cognitions in order to reach a firm decision on search direction matching the myopia of their 
coalition. Thus, our first contribution is to modify the theory of problemistic search to take into 
account how myopia from the experience of decision-making groups directs the search triggered by 
performance feedback. In particular, we bring attention to the importance of external experience as a 
source of managerial cognition and myopic search by organizations. The second contribution is to 
add coalition formation as an outcome of managerial experience and a mechanism linking 
managerial myopia to problemistic search direction. The third contribution is to add theory and 
measures that let the researcher assess potential coalitions, detect the likely dominant coalition, and 
predict the direction of change that matches the dominant coalition myopia. In sum, the new theory 
provides problemistic search theory with predictions on what action is chosen in organizational 
change, not just whether and when the change happens.  
We apply the theory to acquisitions, a strategic behavior that is strongly influenced by 
performance feedback (Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan 2006; Iyer and Miller 2008), but past 
research has not examined whether decisions on what to acquire are the result of myopic search. 
Acquisitions are approved by the board of directors. We can identify the experience of each board 
member (director), make inferences on their cognitions when choosing solutions, and predict the 
potential coalition formation and their likely decisions (Desai 2016; Dowell, Shackell and Stuart 
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2011; Ocasio 1994). If the experience of directors indicates a likely destination for myopic search, we 
can identify the sources of myopia and predict the actions chosen as a result of myopia and coalition 
building. Our context is listed firms in China from 2000 onwards, after market reforms in the 1980s 
and the growth of the stock market in the 1990s. Firms in our study have a mixture of board members 
with various degrees of commitment to market competition and state control. Board differences in 
the proportions of such directors resulted in rich variation in the composition of the decision making 
group that determines strategic actions such as acquisitions. We examine how choices of acquisition 
targets can be explained by variables describing performance feedback and the composition of board 
member experiences and the potential for forming a dominant coalition.  
Problemistic Search 
The behavioral theory of the firm specified that performance below an aspiration level on an 
organizational goal triggers problemistic search (Cyert and March 1963). Problemistic search is 
oriented toward solving the problem of low performance, and it will continue until decision-
makers are satisfied with a proposed solution. This in turn leads to organizational change. The 
theory of low performance leading to problemistic search and organizational change has been 
supported for a wide range of outcomes (Shinkle 2012), and has been characterized as an essential 
contribution of the theory due to its foundation in bounded rationality and its goal of predicting the 
choices in firms (Gavetti et al. 2012). Problemistic search occurs because of bounded rationality; 
decision makers not only have insufficient information, which could be the case even when fully 
rational, they also use problems in the form of low performance to judge when they need to search 
for alternatives to the current actions of the organization (Cyert and March 1963). Problemistic 
search is consequential because decision makers cannot find the best choice; rather they will settle 
for the first alternative that has been found and that satisfies their criteria. This role of problemistic 
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search in the theory shows that the performance level should predict the decision to change (Greve 
2003b).  
The theory also specifies that search is myopic, which means that it is in the neighborhood of the 
problem symptom and the current alternative (Cyert and March 1963). The theory predicts that the 
performance measure can be used to situate the myopic search and orient it toward making 
incremental changes to specific activities in that unit. However, commonly a broad performance 
measure such as ROA is used to predict either large-scale strategic change or a wide range of specific 
changes (Audia, Locke and Smith 2000; Greve 2003a; Salge 2011; Shinkle 2012). This research 
raises the question of why the same performance measure should influence so many kinds of change. 
There are studies having a good match such as low market share being used to predict market niche 
change (Greve 1998) and accidents used to predict safety improvements (Baum and Dahlin 2007), 
but such studies are rare. With current evidence showing that ROA increases the rate of many 
organizational changes, but not whether it directs search, a natural next step is to examine what other 
sources of myopia can effectively predict the action chosen in one type of organizational change.  
Cognitive patterns can lead firms to pursue distinct strategic paths, helping some discover 
strategic positions that are different from those of other firms (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000). To 
integrate cognition and search theory it is necessary to specify (1) how specific decision makers in a 
firm differ in cognition and knowledge and (2) how individual decision makers aggregate to a group-
level decision on the direction of myopic search. The first point draws on decision-maker experience 
as a source of cognition and knowledge. For the second point, the behavioral theory of the firm 
specified that decision makers could form coalitions in favor of an alternative under consideration, 
even if different decision makers within the same coalition had different reasons for preferring the 
alternative (Cyert and March 1963).  
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Cognitive Sources of Myopia 
There is already a theoretically grounded alternative path for examining how problemistic search 
is directed. Cyert and March (1963: 122) posited that one source of bias and myopia is the training 
and experience that organizational members obtained in their work. This has been overlooked in later 
theory construction and empirical studies, and is the foundation for our theoretical development. 
Indeed, decision makers who initiate search need guidance on where to search, and cognitive patterns 
resulting from their training and experience are prime targets for examining where they get this 
guidance from. Cyert and March (1963: 124-125) saw simple-minded search as a result of the 
organization learning from its experience and repeating changes, possibly but not necessarily after 
observing the success of previous changes (Kelly and Amburgey 1991; March, Sproull and Tamuz 
1991). However, that proposal does not specify whether organizations will be biased toward internal 
experience or will draw from external sources of experience (Levitt and March 1988). 
Extending the argument of Cyert and March (1963), the experience that individual decision 
makers have obtained outside the organization, such as through education or past work, should also 
be considered as a source of myopia. Experience provides ways of thinking that a decision maker 
may apply when solving problems, causing the decision maker to match past solutions to current 
problems. It is particularly important for the board of directors, because they are supposed to bring 
their outside experience to bear when the organization makes important decisions (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson 1990; Westphal and Fredrickson 2001). There is abundant evidence that experience drawn 
from other board memberships influence their decision making (e.g., Davis and Greve 1997; 
Haunschild 1993; Tuschke, Sanders and Hernandez 2014). The key observation needed to add 
experience to the theory of myopic search is that decision makers assess alternatives based on their 
cognitive maps of the world and their specific knowledge related to each alternative (Argote and 
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Miron-Spektor 2011; Dokko and Gaba 2012). Each component impacts cognition because 
experience affects alternatives considered, estimates of their benefits, and confidence in the 
estimates. First, cognitive maps influence what alternatives are considered (Gavetti 2005; Kaplan 
2011), as seen both in research on firms sharing a myopic view of the industry (Porac, Thomas and 
Baden-Fuller 1989; Porac et al. 1995) and in work examining divergence in the cognitive maps 
among industry participants (Fiol 1990; Pegels, Song and Yang 2000). Second, cognitions about each 
alternative are shaped by specific experiences that build models of how actions are related to 
consequences and build confidence in the repetition of actions with past success (Argote 1999; 
Kraatz and Moore 2002). The confidence is rooted in knowledge on what can be done and how it can 
be done, gained through learning from experience (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011) 
The idea of cognitions and knowledge guiding managerial action has a role in multiple research 
traditions. Studies of organizational attention have emphasized the interplay between organizational 
signals that direct attention and executives who are alert to such signals (Ocasio 2011). In strategy, 
managerial dominant logics are cognitive patterns that are acquired through experience and influence 
the actions and outcomes of firms (Prahalad and Bettis 1986). In research on knowledge evolution, 
search is seen as local to the current knowledge of the firm as a result of an emphasis on improving 
current knowledge rather than exploring unknown areas of knowledge (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001; 
Stuart and Podolny 1996). These lines of research all point to experience as a source of myopic 
search. For brevity, we will refer to these arguments as the cognitive view in the following 
discussion, keeping in mind that knowledge is also important. 
Potential Coalitions 
A key theoretical challenge is to move from the explanations of firm rigidity that are so common 
in the cognitive view (e.g., Porac et al. 1989; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000) to theory of predictable 
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change that examines differences between decision makers and coalition formation. Drawing from 
the theory of coalitions in managerial decision making (Cyert and March, 1963), we go from 
individual experiences as myopia sources to a prediction on the expected myopia of a decision-
making group based on the likely coalitions of members with similar experiences.  The mechanism is 
that some form of majority decision rule will be used, an argument that has been supported by work 
finding that the cognitive patterns that are most frequent in a decision making group will dominate 
the discussion, often leading to suppression of alternative views (Bazerman, Giuliano and Appelman 
1984; Greve and Zhang 2016; Peterson et al. 1998). Thus, the cognitive pattern most prevalent in a 
decision making group is likely to steer the problemistic search in a direction that is proximate to its 
assumptions and knowledge. This finding is the same as a prediction from organizational politics of a 
powerful dominant coalition determining firm actions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), but the 
mechanism is one of (possibly false) consensus rather than contestation. The theoretical problem that 
needs to be solved is that dominant coalitions are assembled from members with diversity in their 
general cognitive patterns and assessment of specific alternatives, so knowing the experience of 
decision-makers is only the first step in the theory. From there, potential coalitions can be assessed by 
examining the size of subgroups with shared cognitions that are likely to engage in coalition building, 
as well as the size of subgroups that are not already committed, and hence can be attracted to 
coalitions.  
The theory and evidence so far suggests that (1) problemistic search is triggered by performance 
relative to aspiration levels, (2) managerial cognitions and knowledge influence strategic decisions 
by making some alternatives seem proximate and others distant, and (3) decision-making groups 
direct search to favor the cognitions and knowledge that are held by a coalition of their members. 
Based on the three theoretical elements, we have three tasks to obtain a rigorous clear prediction on 
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the direction of change. First, the experience of each manager can be examined for potential 
influences on the cognition, and the likely effect on judgments of alternative actions that are 
proximate from their point of view can be derived. Second, for each potential direction of search that 
the decision-making group can take, the proportion of managers who see it as proximate can be 
assessed and used to predict what search direction matches the decision making group, and hence 
which action is the likely choice in response to performance pressure. Third, the overall composition 
of the decision-making group can be assessed to estimate the strength of the coalition that can be 
formed in favor of one search direction – the potential coalition. These steps amount to finding the 
most prevalent form of myopia and predicting that search will be consistent with it. 
In order to test this model of organizational change triggered by performance feedback and 
directed by cognitions of decision makers, we need to specify what the cognitions are and how they 
influence judgments of which actions are proximate and which are distant. This is a specific question 
that should be related to the empirical context and concrete differences among decision makers 
(Meindl, Stubbart and Porac 1994). To do so, we introduce our empirical context, the acquisition 
decisions by firms during the transition to a market economy in China. This context and outcome is 
appealing because the market transition gave the board of directors responsibility for highly 
consequential M&A decisions that were contentious because of the coexistence and divergence 
between market and state cognitions in boards, which in turn can be traced to director backgrounds, 
making it a sharp test of our theory. 
State and Market Cognition in Transitional China 
Since the 1980s, market reforms have moved China from a system of state socialism with 
societal goals pursued through state control and redistribution of resources to one of market 
capitalism based on markets and profit-seeking corporations (Nee 1992). One of the principal market 
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reforms is partially privatizing State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and allowing entry of firms with no 
state ownership, giving many firms the goals of private enterprises (Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui 2006). 
The period from year 2000 to year 2012 was widely regarded as a new stage in the development of 
the listed firms in China when the private sector became an integral part of the socialist economy 
(Jiang, Yue and Zhao 2009), and is the time of our study. However, the state retained ownership in 
many firms, and boards of firms both with and without state ownership may include directors with 
experience working for state agencies and hence familiarity with the cognitive patterns of state 
socialism, in addition to board members with training and experience in a market economy. Thus, we 
are looking at a population of firms with a variety of board compositions, and the composition within 
each firm also changes over time as the market reform deepens, and for firm specific reasons. 
State cognition. In state socialism, firms are seen as an actor in a redistributive economy that 
channels goods or services to the state, and in turn receives resources from the state (Szelenyi 1978). 
In the state socialism cognitive pattern, firms are not supposed to interact with the market or earn 
profits, instead they function as cost centers and redistributive agencies that respond to central 
decisions through a hierarchy of government control at the local, provincial, regional and national 
levels. Firms organize the production in their industry and maintain balanced and stable demand and 
supply. In listed firms in China, the presence of directors who have experience working or are still 
working for state agencies is quite common. Their cognitions are likely to be influenced by state 
socialism, so they are used to follow instructions to align firm behaviors with state objectives and 
seek state opinion and help when making changes (Zhou, Tse and Li 2006).  
When comparison of performance and an aspiration level signals a problem or an opportunity, 
directors with state experience see lobbying for state intervention and favor as an appealing 
alternative. Even when additional assets are needed for the firm, they prefer asset transfer without 
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acquisition or a state-bridged acquisition that is initiated by the state’s advice over ordinary M&As 
that require more active search on the equity market. Thus, acquisitions of other firms through the 
equity market is a distant approach for them because it involves firm initiative and actions in the 
market. Also, it is distant for state-experience directors because the post-M&A integration can imply 
seeking efficiency through labor force reductions, which goes against the state goal of labor market 
stability (Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar 2008). Searching for acquisition targets is also problematic for 
them because it involves internal power changes, as the financial and managerial expertise required 
for post-acquisition integration leaves directors with market economy experience with more intra-
organizational power (Bunderson 2003; Hickson et al. 1971). As a result, searching on the market for 
M&A targets is a distant approach for state directors when performance feedback indicates a 
problem, whereas asset transfer and relying on the state to introduce an M&A target is the more 
proximate choice.  
Market cognition. In market capitalism, firms are independent profit-seeking entities that strive 
for economic efficiency through market exchange and competition, and their value is determined by 
the cash flow provided to shareholders (Fligstein 1990). In the market economy cognitive pattern, the 
firm has significant autonomy because it is based on private ownership and property rights, which are 
valued and protected, and thus it is not linked with the state except through the effects of regulation. 
In most listed firms in China, including SOEs, the boards typically include directors who are familiar 
with markets through their education and experience, and have cognitions influenced by this 
experience. They see a special role for themselves because they are part of an established corporate 
governance and management system that preserves shareholder rights and ensures that these rights 
take priority over those of all other stakeholders (Davis and Stout 1992).  
Directors with market related work experience and education have the knowledge necessary to 
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evaluate growth opportunities in the market and take risk in their decisions in order to increase firm 
value. Therefore, when comparison of performance and an aspiration level indicates a problem or an 
opportunity to initiate search, they are willing to search for solutions beyond the local scope, such as 
acquisitions in the equity market. Indeed, searching for acquisition targets is not a distant approach, 
but rather a natural search direction given the frequent use of M&As by firms in market economies 
(Haleblian et al. 2006; Iyer and Miller 2008). Acquisitions are proximate strategic actions that they 
employ as a potential solution to overcome performance problems or growth constraints. 
Acquisitions are connected with strategic rationales such as gain in market power (Singal 1996), 
synergy through transfer of resources between the acquiring and acquired firm (Capron, Dussauge 
and Mitchell 1998; Capron and Pistre 2002), and rapid entry into high-growth industries (Gaur, 
Malhotra and Zhu 2013). They are more proximate to directors with market experience as a solution 
than internal transfer of assets or  state-bridged acquisitions. 
Firm Acquisitions. In order to examine the direction of search and the corresponding choice of 
action taken, we go into detailed investigation of the source and form of acquisition target that a firm 
chooses. The source and form of acquisition targets have characteristics that can be related to board 
member experience in an acquisition decision. Thus, they can serve as indicators of which group of 
board members prefer and are likely to advocate the choice of specific acquisition targets, and hence 
whether board member experience directs myopic search. Briefly, there are three main sources of 
acquisition target: internal acquisitions within the same corporation; state-bridged acquisition in 
which the target is introduced and advised by the state; and market-oriented acquisitions, which is the 
typical M&A in market economy. They follow the order from the least market-oriented to the most. 
Among market-oriented acquisitions, we further distinguish the form of acquisition targets by asset 
only, minority equity control and majority equity control, also following the order from the least 
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market-oriented to the most. To proceed quickly to the hypotheses, we defer to the methodology 
section the full discussion on how different sources and forms of acquisition targets can be 
categorized as proximate to market cognitions, or conversely, as state cognitions.  
Hypotheses 
Even with a mixture of board directors having different cognitive priority, Chinese listed firms 
are still conventional firms with the goal of higher profitability, among other goals. Performance 
feedback theory predicts that performance relative to the aspiration level influences the rate of 
change, with a different effect above and below the aspiration level (Greve 1998). This prediction has 
been supported for many dependent variables, also for acquisitions (Haleblian et al. 2006; Iyer and 
Miller 2008), and will just be taken as a baseline in this research, rather than stated as a hypothesis.  
Rate of change. The theoretical proposition we develop in this study is that a greater proportion 
of the decision making groups applying one cognitive pattern will lead to problemistic search that 
more closely follows its myopic path.  Because the performance variable of profitability is especially 
relevant in a market economy, it is useful to start with the effect that it has on directors with market 
experience, as they are most focused on this goal. Other directors may be less concerned about 
profitability, so its effect on problemistic search and organizational change is greater when the board 
has a higher proportion of directors with market capitalism education and working experience. Thus, 
boards with a high proportion of directors with market experience can be expected to be more 
responsive to the performance relative to the aspiration level. This prediction can be made with 
respect to any kind of change, without distinguishing the direction of search, and then specific 
predictions on the direction of search can be added.  
Decision-maker myopia influencing the direction of search could influence the organizational 
response to performance both below and above the aspiration level, but there are theoretical reasons 
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to expect the effect to be stronger above the aspiration level. Performance below the aspiration level 
means that the firm strategy gets questioned (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel and Bierman 2010; Westphal 
and Bednar 2005), resulting in lower managerial discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987). The 
difference in discretion is seen in the greater range of actions taken by high-performing 
organizations, which span from cautious adherence to the current strategy to acts of hubris such as 
risky acquisitions and corporate illegality (Hayward and Hambrick 1997; Mishina, Dykes, Block and 
Pollock 2010). If the decision-making group has greater authority and less external pressure, its 
composition will have more influence over the decision, thus leading to stronger group experience 
effects above the aspiration level than below it. Interestingly, this increasing authority could allow the 
group to selectively emphasize actions that fit its cognitive myopia even though the performance 
above the aspiration level reduces problemistic search. This could result in the favored action of the 
group becoming more likely when a change is made, even if changes are less frequent because 
problemistic search is reduced. The prediction on the rate of change is: 
Hypothesis 1: The rate of acquisitions will be more strongly influenced by performance relative to 
aspiration levels when a greater proportion of directors have market experience. 
We can also make hypotheses on the effect of directors who have experience with the state and 
have adopted its cognitive patterns. Although they could also pursue profits when acting as directors 
of a firm listed in the stock market, unfamiliarity with the market cognitive pattern and commitment 
to state socialism ways of thinking make this more difficult. Moreover, directors are particularly 
sensitive to low performance as a threat that could trigger dominant responses (Staw 1981; Zajonc 
1980), so they will search for a familiar solution that they see as the safest and most effective 
approach: seek state advice and help. This is also the approach that best uses their knowledge on how 
to gain attention and resources from state actors. This can be specified as a separate effect because a 
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board is not split between directors who have state experience and market experience; some directors 
have neither one, and some have both. Directors with state experience and directors with market 
experience can thus be seen as holding the most extreme views of the board and as being sources of 
influence on the other directors. This means that the proportion of directors with state experience has 
a dampening effect on the rate of change in response to performance feedback. Thus we predict: 
Hypothesis 2: The rate of acquisitions will be more weakly influenced by performance relative to 
aspiration levels when a greater proportion of directors have state experience. 
Choice of change. These predictions state the effect of a decision making group composition 
and its cognitions on the rate of change, but do not take advantage of the theory on how the direction 
of search is influenced by cognitions. Although acquisitions are typical firm actions in market 
capitalism, some types of acquisitions are still distant choices for managers with market experience. 
The internal acquisitions and state-bridged acquisitions that result from state intervention are clearly 
distinct from market-oriented acquisitions in the equity market, and the market-oriented acquisitions 
are clearer reflections of a market cognitive pattern. Indeed, internal acquisitions and state-bridged 
acquisitions could be intended to maintain employment levels in an area when a large firm is in risk 
of failing, which is a very distant mindset from the market cognition (Wang 2014). Also, directors 
with market experience will have knowledge on how to execute market-oriented acquisitions, but 
will be less familiar with state-bridged acquisitions. 
Members of decision-making groups will apply their experience to the judgment of which 
direction of search is the best match to the problem or opportunity, leading to potential conflict 
between subgroups of decision makers with different kinds of cognitive myopia. The coalition-based 
solution to such conflicts is that the subgroup that has the higher proportion of the decision making 
group is able to direct search towards alternatives that are proximate according to its cognitions. For 
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directors with market experience, market based solutions are cognitively proximate solutions to 
performance problems and growth constraints. Thus, directors with market experience are likely to 
advocate market based actions in response to performance relative to the aspiration level (Haleblian 
et al. 2006; Iyer and Miller 2008). It is more likely that their direction of myopic search will be 
implemented by the organization when they have a high proportion in the board membership. 
Conversely, directors with state experience are reluctant to apply market based actions, and are more 
likely to back state-endorsed acquisitions. Thus, the hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 3: Choices proximate to market-oriented solutions will be more strongly influenced by 
performance relative to aspiration levels when a greater proportion of directors have market 
experience. 
Hypothesis 4: Choices proximate to market-oriented solutions will be more weakly influenced by 
performance relative to aspiration levels when a greater proportion of directors have state experience. 
Coalition building. So far the predictions have examined the proportion of directors on each of 
two opposing sides, but this approach overlooks important elements of group decision making. First, 
although one can form groups with similar backgrounds, coalitions still need to be built through 
recognition of common interest and rallying around it. Second, decision-making groups are often 
fractured among members with strong, weak, and no affiliation with a specific background, which 
means that common backgrounds are not sufficient to partition a decision-making group into a 
dominant coalition and a minority. Because boards are split among directors who have multiple kinds 
of experience, and any group can attempt to build a coalition, it is important to develop theory on 
how the overall configuration of board experience affects the decision making. Coalition building 
can fail both for rational and boundedly rational actors (Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez 2001; Cook 
and Rice 2006), and has greater likelihood of success when members of a potential coalition are 
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more numerous and have more intense preferences. A key element of this theory is to identify the 
commitment to specific cognitions by each board member and the cohesion of each group of board 
members holding the same cognition. Theoretically we should expect a board member with multiple 
sources of experience giving the same cognition to be the most committed to a coalition around this 
cognitive pattern; a board member with a single source of experience to be less committed; and a 
board member with experiences from conflicting cognitions to the least committed. Based on this 
simple idea, it should be possible to identify the proportion of board members with each level of 
commitment, yielding a more precise measure of dominant coalition potential.  
The strength of the potential state coalition is of special interest to us because it is likely to resist 
the firm transition to the market-based actions. It can be assessed by multiple factors. First, some 
board members may have multiple types of state experience, resulting in especially rigid state 
cognition. In comparison, board members with type of state experience are likely to hold state 
cognitions but with lower commitment, hence becoming weaker part of the state coalition building. 
Third, some board members may have both state and market experience, and thus may hold dual 
cognitions, becoming even weaker parts of the state coalition building. Indeed, during the market 
transition, the state had dual agendas of both maintaining stable state control and boosting economic 
growth through the merit of market capitalism (Yiu, Hoskisson, Bruton and Lu 2014), so any director 
with state experience can hold elements of both cognitions, though one with market experience 
would be especially likely to do so. Finally, from the state coalition point of view, directors with only 
market experience are adversaries, while directors holding neither kind of cognition are potential 
allies. Conversely, for directors building a market coalition, directors with neither kind of experience 
and directors with both state and market experience would be the most promising potential allies. 
Thus, we examine the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 5: The rate of acquisitions will be more weakly influenced by performance relative to 
aspiration levels when the board has a stronger potential state coalition. 
Hypothesis 6: Choices proximate to market-oriented solutions will be more weakly influenced by 
performance relative to aspiration levels when the board has a stronger potential state coalition. 
Data and Methodology 
Data sources. The data sources are the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database and WIND database. The CSMAR database is maintained by Guo Tai An 
Technology Company in collaboration with the University of Hong Kong and the China Accounting 
and Finance Research Center of Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and covers the ownership, 
board, and financial data of all listed firms in China to date since 1992 (Li, Moshirian, Nguyen and 
Tan 2007; Lin and Su 2008; Rousseau and Xiao 2008). The WIND database, produced by Shanghai-
based Wind Information, provides detailed information on firm M&As, including the date of 
announcement, the acquisition target, and the nature of the acquisition (asset, equity or both). We 
merged the WIND database on acquisitions with one-year lagged CSMAR ownership data, board 
data and fiscal year performance data. The resulting dataset covered every M&A between 2000 and 
2012 by nearly all Chinese listed firms.  
Estimation method and dependent variables. Firm factors influence both the acquisition rate 
and choice of acquisition target, and different targets are competing risks because each acquisition is 
just one of multiple alternatives. This problem can be analyzed sequentially by first estimating the 
hazard rate of all acquisitions, including internal, state-bridged, and market-oriented acquisitions, 
then the choice of what target to acquire (Petersen 1995). Although some of the acquisitions were 
legally defined as mergers, the data allow us to identify those with a clear acquiring and acquired 
partner and specify that the acquiring partner acts to acquire. Thus, all events only occur once in the 
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data. For simplicity we refer to all events as acquisitions.  
The data allowed continuous-time event-history analysis, as the timing of each announcement 
was the exact announcement date of an acquisition. The dependent variable was defined as deals 
classified by WIND as mergers or acquisitions, with no limit on the proportion shares acquired. After 
missing data deletions, the sample consisted of 2,337 firms and 30,469 observations after splitting 
spells annually to update covariates for years 2000 to 2012. Acquisitions are treated as repeated 
events, and the firm is at risk of a new acquisition the day after announcing one. The data have 
12,395 days in which a firm announced at least one acquisition. We did not have any priori 
assumption about the baseline hazard rate, so we employed the Cox proportional hazards model 
controlling for historical time (Cox 1972).  
Source of acquisition target. In the early stage of the privatization process and stock market in 
China, most acquisitions were done internally between subsidiaries and subunits within the same 
enterprise, aiming to dispose of bad assets, write off debt, and aggregate resources in order to prepare 
SOEs for privatization. Such internal transfers were typically directed and supported by the state. 
Gradually, in addition to internal transactions, many inter-firm transactions were done to solve 
financial or operational problems of firms, maintain employment levels, restructure the acquired 
firms, and integrate them into the acquiring firm. The acquirer and the target were typically picked by 
the state. Merger and acquisition under state direction was like the combination of two administrative 
units under state control. These state-bridged acquisitions met the state’s objective of supervising the 
market and employing the market mechanism to grow the firms. Both internal acquisitions and state-
bridged acquisitions continued during our study period, although at a decreasing rate due to the 
deeper penetration of market economy. However, they remain viable choices for all the firms, and 
especially for directors with previous working experience with the state.  
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From year 2000, following the enactment of the Securities Law that formalized the issuance, 
listing, and trading of securities and ensured the efficiency of equity transactions, SOEs and partially 
privatized SOEs became more market-oriented. In addition, a growing population of private firms 
with no state origin emerged on the stock market. All firm categories increasingly engaged in market-
oriented acquisitions, defined as M&As initiated by the firm. In these acquisitions, targets were no 
longer proposed by the state, they were chosen as potentially providing long-term financial returns or 
growth opportunities to the acquiring firms. Market-oriented acquisitions are no longer a 
combination of units under a controlling state; they are one firm acting as an independent actor 
acquiring another and eliminating it as an independent actor.  
Based on the distinction of three sources of acquisitions, each acquisition target can be 
categorized in terms of how distant it is from the cognitions of the state versus market cognitions, and 
hence what type of board member would see it as a more proximate option of change. From the 
perspective of the state cognition director, the most proximate source is (1) internal acquisitions, 
which is movement of assets or equity within a group of firms with at least one common shareholder. 
This operation is common from a state point of view, as firm assets were reorganized under state 
socialism by transferring them from one unit to the other. The middle is (2) state-bridged 
acquisitions, which are like M&As by two independent firms, but with the acquiring and target firm 
chosen by the state. The most distant source for the state cognition directors is (3) market-oriented 
acquisitions, which are initiated because the target is seen as an opportunity for growth and value 
creation by the acquiring firm. These often involve scouting targets on the market, evaluating them 
using financial metrics, and taking risks in the acquisition decision. Accordingly, Source of 
acquisition target is zero for an internal acquisition, one for a state-bridged acquisition, and two for a 
market acquisition. 
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Form of acquisition target. For firms that engaged in market-oriented acquisitions, the 
commitment also evolved as the corporate governance system matured, from only asset transaction 
to equity transaction, from minority shareholding to majority control. We hence further analyze the 
form of market-oriented acquisition as an alternative approach to capture the acquisition target’s 
proximity to market-oriented solutions. From the perspective of the state cognition directors, the 
most proximate form of acquisition is (1) asset acquisitions, which were familiar under state 
socialism and involved less knowledge and managerial effort to integrate into the acquiring firm. The 
middle is (2) minority ownership (less than 50 percent shares), which became more and more 
common as the corporate governance system developed. It is qualitatively different because it 
requires consideration of the current equity value and its future potential. The most distant form is (3) 
majority ownership (50 percent or more of shares), which can lead to full integration of the firms. 
Majority ownership implies substantial financial risk and expensive integration, which the state 
cognition directors are unfamiliar with, but in the market cognition these are a familiar form of 
investments with high but uncertain returns, and hence not something to avoid if the decision makers 
assess the target as sufficiently promising. Thus, Form of acquisition target is zero for market-
oriented acquisition of assets without any equity stake, one for acquisition of minority equity, and 
two for acquisition of a controlling equity stake. 
We analyze these choices as an ordered logit with variables in which higher values mean greater 
distance from state cognition. For this analysis, simultaneous acquisitions by the same firm could be 
analyzed as distinct observations. Table 1 shows a cross-tabulation of source of acquisition target and 
form of acquisition target for all 31,442 acquisitions of equity or assets in the data. As the table 
shows, the rare category in this time period was state-bridged acquisitions, with only 12.38 percent in 
total.  Because all analyses have repeated observations of the same firm, we use robust standard 
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errors with clustering on the firm.  
=== Insert Table 1 about here === 
Independent variables. Following the performance feedback literature (Greve 1998), we 
calculate the performance as return on assets (ROA), and subtract aspiration levels calculated either 
as the weighted average of the past performance with most of the weight (0.9) assigned to the most 
recent ROA (historical aspiration level), or as the average ROA of all firms listed in the stock market 
(social aspiration level). This performance is divided into performance above and below each 
aspiration level and interacted with the variables indicating board member experience.  
To test the hypotheses, we first calculated the proportion of board members with market or state 
experience. From the CSMAR database we had complete data on the resumes of each director, 
including a wide range of information that could be used to make indicators of director training and 
experience, but given our emphasis on market cognition versus state cognition we narrowed the 
information down to the four indicators that were most closely related to each of these cognitive 
patterns. For market experience, we calculate the proportion of board members owning shares in the 
company or having education or work experience in an Anglo-Saxon nation. For state experience, we 
calculate the proportion of board members with work experience in a state agency or in a state-
owned bank. These variables serve as indicators of experience and comfort with the market and the 
state, respectively, and will be used to form interactions with the performance for tests of H1 through 
H4. 
To test H5 and H6 on coalition formation, we made aggregate variables indicating the state 
dominant coalition potential. The first variable is made by a factor analysis of all boards using the 
proportions of board members with two sources of state experience (mean 0.03), one source of state 
experience (0.38), both state and market experience (0.09), and market experience (0.28). A principal 
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factors analysis yielded a first factor with positive loading of all proportions and a second factor with 
positive loading of two and one sources of state experience, and negative loading of market and 
state/market experience. The second factor aligns well with the theory, as it suggests that boards can 
be ordered by their potential for forming a coalition of members with state experience. We use this 
factor as a stateness factor coalition variable, and interact it with the performance. In addition we 
made a stateness score using heuristic weights of 2 for two sources of state experience, 1 for one 
source of state experience, 0.5 for state and market experience, and -1 for market experience only. 
We also interact this variable with the performance. Note that the heuristic weights are reasonable, 
though clearly not the only alternative, but the greatest uncertainty is around the rare categories of 
mixed experience and two sources of state experience. Altering the weights of these categories will 
thus have minor effects on the overall score. As the correlation table shows, these two distinct 
approaches produced similar measures, but we still show the findings of both as an indicator of their 
robustness. 
Our control variables include 84 industry and 31 province fixed effects. We controlled for the 
age of the firm in case older firms have lower propensity to merge. We controlled for firm size by 
taking the logarithm of the firm’s total assets. We also considered the impact of a firm’s growth 
opportunities on acquisitions, using the market-to-book ratio. We included the debt-to-equity ratio to 
capture the potential impact of a firm’s financial leverage on acquisition decisions. Prior acquisition 
experience is positively related to the likelihood of subsequent acquisitions (Haleblian et al. 2006), so 
we calculated the cumulative number of acquisitions of assets only, a minority stake, and a 
controlling stake of equity. We enter these three because correlation among the cumulative 
acquisition variables is too high to allow entry of more than two, and preliminary analysis showed 
that state-bridged acquisitions had the lowest explanatory power. We employed the measure used by 
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Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) for the percentage of free cash flow to control for some of the 
inefficient investments that firms may make driven by excess resources. We also included the 
diversification level of a firm, operationalized as the count of industries a firm engages in.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the event history dataset are shown in Table 2, which 
shows that none of the correlations are at levels that cause estimation problems. The descriptive 
statistics and correlations for the other analyses are very similar, so we do not display separate tables 
for them. Table 3 shows the analysis of the rate of acquisitions. The results demonstrate that the rate 
of finding an acquisition solution is not dependent on the proportion of each director type, so 
Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5 lack support. This is not because the rate is independent of the performance; in 
fact there is the frequent finding of a positive relation from performance to the rate of acquisition for 
the social aspiration level. This effect is contrary to problemistic search, but has been found before 
and been explained either by threat rigidity (Audia and Greve 2006) or local search directed toward 
incremental improvements (Iyer and Miller 2008). A third explanation, consistent with the fact that 
this effect is only seen for social aspiration levels, is that performance below the industry average 
makes acquisitions difficult to implement. Thus, the findings repeat an earlier finding that 
performance relative to aspiration levels can influence the acquisition rate, indicating that the firms in 
the sample react in the same way as firms in developed economies, but the theoretical extension to 
myopic search is not supported. 
=== Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here === 
Table 4 shows the ordered logit of the source of acquisition target. The main effects indicate a 
shift toward market-oriented acquisitions when the performance increases relative to the historical 
aspiration level, but a decline relative to the social aspiration level. The effect signs are interesting, as 
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higher than historical performance produces the confidence to choose more market-oriented 
acquisitions, whereas higher performance than other firms induces caution. The interaction variables 
for different sources of state and market cognition do not predict well when entered one at a time, as 
they are often insignificant, but when they are significant they indicate higher sensitivity to 
performance relative to aspiration levels for market-oriented directors, and lower for state-oriented 
directors, in support of Hypotheses 2 and 4. Thus, directors with market experience show reactions to 
performance relative to historical aspiration levels that are consistent with research on the link 
between hubris and acquisitions (Hayward and Hambrick 1997; Pangarkar and Lie 2004).  
=== Insert Table 4 about here === 
The final two models test Hypothesis 6 on the effect of the potential state dominant coalition. 
Here, the results indicate strong support for the hypothesis, as every coefficient estimate of the 
interactions shows that a stronger state coalition weakens the effect of performance on the choice of 
market-oriented acquisitions.  Indeed, the coefficient magnitudes are so strong that they indicate the 
potential for a reversed (opposite-signed) effect for firms with a strong state coalition. To examine the 
results in more detail, we show graphs of the effect of the stateness factor (Figure 1) and the stateness 
score (Figure 2), drawing curves for the effect of firms that have stateness two degrees below and 
above the mean, and mean stateness.1 Figure 1 shows that the main-effect shift toward market 
orientation when performance is above historical aspiration levels and below social aspiration levels 
holds true for average stateness, and is even stronger for high stateness. For low stateness the curves 
are flat (and tests show that the slopes are not significantly different from zero). Thus, the aggregate 
stateness factor gives much clearer findings than the individual state or market experience scores. 
Figure 2 shows similar result for the stateness score, and for this measure too, the curve has a slope 
                                                        
1 Showing the probabilities of each outcome requires assumptions on the base rates for the conditional logit, so for 
simplicity the figures show the regression function prediction (bX). 
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not significantly different from zero for firms with low stateness. 
=== Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here === 
The findings show that the effects of board composition are stronger above the aspiration level, 
as one would expect from the greater board discretion when the firm has high performance. The 
findings below the aspiration levels are weak for firms with high or average stateness, whereas they 
are strong above the aspiration level for firms with average or low stateness. The findings are 
consistent with past studies showing that changes are highly likely when performance is below the 
aspiration level, but do not become more likely as the performance declines further below the 
aspiration level, while the likelihood of changes declines steadily as performance increases if it is 
above the aspiration level (e.g., Greve 1998, 2003a; Miller and Chen 2004). The juxtaposition of the 
findings from the rate of change and the type of change is informative because it shows a lower rate 
of change when high performance reduces problemistic search, but greater likelihood of change 
consistent with the cognitive patterns of directors with market experience. 
=== Insert Table 5 about here === 
Table 5 shows the ordered logit of the form of acquisition target, with the analysis restricted to 
market-oriented acquisitions. This analysis thus provides additional evidence on a set of acquisitions 
that already are highly market-oriented. Again the analyses taking individual measures of market or 
state experience show few findings, though each finding is consistent with Hypothesis 4. The final 
two models have two main findings, both above the aspiration level. For historical aspiration levels, 
there is a clear shift toward market-oriented acquisitions as a main effect, but with interaction effects 
showing that the state coalition works against this effect. For social aspiration levels, there is a shift 
away from market-oriented acquisitions for high performance, and again the effect is much weaker 
(and statistically insignificant) for firms with high stateness. Table 4 has clearer findings, as one may 
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expect from its broader analysis of all acquisitions, but the subset analysis in Table 5 also shows 
some support of Hypothesis 6. As in Table 5, there are clear indications that a weak state coalition is 
an opportunity for the market coalition, and especially when high performance gives managerial 
discretion (e.g., Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987). 
Additional results. In addition to the analysis reporting tests of the hypotheses, we also 
exploited the rich data to examine some relations that could further test the underlying theory. First, 
SOEs’ access to financing from the state through loans has not disappeared after the market reforms, 
and it offers a potential direction of search that will let SOEs avoid market-oriented acquisitions. We 
have access to major loan applications by firms through the CSMAR database, and we can examine 
whether SOEs used loan applications in response to low performance in the same way that listed 
firms used acquisitions. In this analysis (available from the authors), we found that directors with 
market experience had virtually no effect on the loan applications of SOEs. Directors with state 
experience had strong effects, however, with significant and strong increases in loan applications 
when the board had many directors with state agency experience in general, or experience 
specifically in agencies with economic or commercial focus, or state-owned bank background. 
Further analysis of whether the loan application stated that the loan was needed to solve a problem 
showed similar results, with loans having such justification being more frequent following low 
performance and boards with many directors with a state agency and state-owned bank background. 
Analysis of firms that were not state-owned showed weak performance effects on loan applications 
from state-owned banks. Thus, SOEs were sensitive to performance when applying for loans, and 
were particularly driven by directors with a state background in making loan applications in response 
to low performance.  
29 
 
Discussion 
This study started with a theoretical gap in the behavioral theory of the firm, which has kept a 
research stream on how the rate of change in organizations is determined from making more specific 
findings on the direction of organizational search. Further progress calls for addressing three 
problems. First, the problemistic search producing organizational change is triggered by performance 
below the aspiration level, but it is not clear whether and how it actually is myopic rather than broad. 
Second, the type of goal signaling a problem was viewed as a key driver of myopia, but empirically 
firms have been observed to change following low performance on broad goals such as return on 
assets. These cannot be a source of myopia because the performance they measure encompasses all 
firm activities. Third, just as the performance measures have been very broad, so have the responses 
examined empirically been highly varied across studies. 
We address this problem by looking at cognitive patterns based on experience as sources of 
myopia. This gives general theory on how problemistic search is directed by decision makers, which 
provides a solution to the problem of performance measures being too broad to give guidance. The 
general theory can be turned into specific hypotheses in a context with decision maker experiences 
linked with cognitive patterns, and we use the market transition in China as an opportunity to 
examine how a specific group of decision makers – boards of directors – act differently depending on 
the firm performance and the proportion of directors with market versus state experience. The boards 
can be characterized even more precisely by considering how coalition formation depends on the 
proportions of members with allegiance to each side, including different levels of allegiance. This is a 
good example of how the general theory can be turned into specific hypotheses on how firms 
respond to performance in ways that match the experience of most decision makers. 
The findings were clear. Whereas regular measures of performance relative to aspirations guided 
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the frequency of change, as usual, their interactions with board characteristics did not have such 
effects. Board experience appears unrelated to rates of change. However, when distinguishing 
between changes that were more or less consistent with market cognition, the models showed higher 
likelihood of changes that matched a market economy when the board had more members with 
market experience, and lower when the board had more members with state experience. The findings 
were particularly clear when using comprehensive measures based on theory of coalition formation. 
These are novel findings in support of new theory that fills a gap in research on how performance 
affects organizational actions.  
The findings did show some inconsistent results across the different measures of market 
experience and state experience, which can in part be attributed to imperfections of the measures, 
especially because there are more kinds of market experience than what our measures capture. 
Indeed, the stronger findings when making comprehensive measures of dominant coalition formation 
potential indicate that partial measures have weaknesses. However, our model of how individual 
orientations towards search add up to a group decision is also simplified because acquisitions cannot 
just be chosen off the shelf; even boards with a clear search pattern needs to find a firm that can be 
acquired and that fits the search pattern.  
The findings are not just of theoretical interest, they also show that cognitive patterns guide very 
consequential organizational behaviors. For example, in each step from internal to state-bridged to 
market-oriented acquisitions, the board is moving the firm closer to a market orientation in its 
acquisition activities. The choice between a state-bridged and a market-oriented acquisition is 
important for the firm. State-bridged acquisitions have a safety valve because the state is willing to 
support a firm that gets economic difficulties after taking over a weak firm as a rescue operation. 
They also have limited upside because it is understood that the purpose of taking over such firms is 
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not to go through restructuring to greatly increase efficiency and decrease labor use. Market-oriented 
acquisitions are the opposite. The acquiring firm has relatively free hands in what it can do to profit 
from the acquisitions, but it is on its own if the acquisition fails.  
There are great opportunities for extending this type of investigation to other cognitive patterns 
and other behaviors. For example, firms founded on financial, technological, and market 
considerations will have top management teams with clear affiliation to different organizational units 
and different education. Just as such differences have been shown to influence changes in the 
selection criteria of CEOs over time (Fligstein 1990), one can also examine whether top management 
teams direct the organization differently as a result of experience and education steering myopic 
search (Cho and Hambrick 2006; Hambrick, Cho and Chen 1996; Nielsen and Nielsen 2013). There 
are already clear suggestions that backgrounds matter for firm choices, such as responses to 
deregulation (Cho and Hambrick 2006), engagement in corporate social responsibility (Chin, 
Hambrick and Treviño 2013), initiation of competitive moves (Hambrick et al. 1996), and strategic 
change (Haynes and Hillman 2010), but these have not been coupled with the behavioral theory of 
the firm in the way done here. A distinct feature of the theory developed here is that cognitive 
patterns are especially important for directing problemistic search, and they matter more when 
organizational performance triggers search.  This idea should lead to more fruitful investigations of 
leadership background effects on organizational behaviors. 
This investigation started with an important theoretical question that has not been answered well 
so far. Although myopic search has been seen as an important component of the behavioral theory of 
the firm, it has not been theoretically described in a way that translates readily into empirical work, 
making giving myopic search the position of an important but hard-to-use mechanism for predicting 
how organizations will change. This is different from the successful predictions of when 
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organizations will change that have resulted from examination of problemistic search as a result of 
comparing performance and aspiration levels. The solution proposed here is a closer link to theory of 
cognition and knowledge, and to how decisions in groups are made. The result is novel from the 
viewpoint of both theories. Problemistic search theory gains predictions on how organizations will 
change, not just when. Cognitive theory gains predictions on how organizations will change, not just 
which organizations have difficulty changing. Both theories can be combined with research on top 
management teams to investigate the triggers and direction of search, and resulting strategic changes. 
These theoretical additions are highly general and useful for additional empirical work. This 
investigation only scratches the surface of the theoretical and empirical progress that can be made by 
adding cognition to the theory of problemistic search and myopia.   
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Table 1: Tabulation of Source and Form of Acquisition Target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cells show number of events and percentage (in parenthesis). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  ௔ 
 
 
ୟ A total of 2,337 firms and 33,369 spells comprise the data. 
  Acquisition 
Target Form   
Acquisition Target Source   Asset only   Minority share Majority share 
Internal 11,769 (37.43)    
State-bridged   3,894 (12.38)    
Market-oriented   15,779 (50.18) 3,217 (10.23) 7,298 (23.21) 5,264 (16.74) 
Total 31,442 (100.00)    
Mean s. d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Age 10.77 5.81 1       
2. Size 21.45 1.36 .13 1       
3. Market to book 1.95 1.52 -.12 -.38 1       
4. Debt to equity 1.86 17.44 .03 .04 -.04 1       
5. Free cash flow  1.73 7.73 -.22 -.02 .09 .01 1       
6. Diversification level 1.97 1.43 .22 .11 -.15 .00 .02 1           
7. Cumulative asset  3.96 6.02 .35 .23 -.11 .01 .04 .19 1          
8. Cumulative minority  2.47 4.66 .26 .32 -.10 .02 .02 .15 .25 1          
9. Cumulative control  2.07 3.62 .30 .30 -.10 .01 .03 .19 .70 .32 1         
10. Holding shares .19 .24 -.18 -.05 .07 -.02 -.02 -.07 -.19 -.07 -.13 1        
11. Anglo-Saxon educ .03 .07 .02 .19 .00 -.00 -.01 -.02 .04 .11 .05 -.03 1       
12. State experience .38 .24 .11 .28 -.15 .02 .02 .06 .10 .06 .06 -.14 .11 1      
13. State-owned bank .20 .40 .11 .19 -.05 .02 .01 .04 .05 .13 .08 -.09 .10 .23 1     
14. Stateness factor .39 .13 .16 .18 -.14 .03 .03 .07 .14 .05 .08 -.57 -.10 .65 .29 1    
15. Stateness score .10 .38 .16 .12 -.13 .03 .03 .08 .14 .04 .07 -.66 -.16 .56 .20 .97 1   
16. ROA – hist. AL .03 .09 -.08 .10 .17 -.02 -.01 -.04 .01 .02 .02 .07 .04 .02 -.02 -.07 -.07 1  
17. ROA – soc. AL -.01 .09 -.07 .10 .05 -.02 -.01 .02 -.03 .00 -.02 .07 .01 .01 -.01 -.05 -.06 .87  
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Table 3: Cox model of acquisition rate 
  Board composition interaction variable 
 
Variable 
  Holding 
Shares
Anglo-Saxon 
experience
State 
experience
State-owned 
Bank
Stateness 
factor
Stateness
score
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age -0.018** -0.017** -0.016** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.016**
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Size 0.209** 0.198** 0.197** 0.194** 0.199** 0.195** 0.198** 0.197**
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Market to book value 0.049** 0.034** 0.029** 0.029** 0.031** 0.032** 0.032** 0.031**
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Debt to equity -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Free cash flow 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Diversification level 0.018* 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.020** 0.020** 0.021** 0.021**
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Cumulative asset experience 0.015** 0.015** 0.016** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.016** 0.016**
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cumulative minority exper. 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.020** 0.021** 0.021**
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cumulative control exper. 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.018** 0.018**
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Proportion state ownership -0.293** -0.289** -0.275** -0.277** -0.273** -0.272** -0.270** -0.266**
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Board composition variable -0.057 0.206 -0.036 0.595** -0.032 -0.007
 (0.074) (0.224) (0.060) (0.186) (0.127) (0.044)
ROA- historical AL, < AL -0.003 -0.341 -0.001 0.415 0.020 0.800 0.310
 (0.398) (0.435) (0.418) (0.694) (0.443) (1.441) (0.477)
   X Board composition  4.973* 0.633 -1.268 -1.055 -1.721 -0.973
 (2.138) (6.363) (1.597) (5.118) (3.205) (1.144)
ROA- historical AL, > AL 1.161** 0.729* 1.080** 1.525** 0.996** 3.146** 1.376**
 (0.320) (0.368) (0.338) (0.552) (0.372) (0.933) (0.329)
   X Board composition  3.258* 1.490 -1.024 1.265 -5.151* -2.041**
 (1.356) (3.708) (1.139) (3.193) (2.247) (0.780)
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ROA- social AL, < AL 0.419 0.487 0.376 0.250 0.411 0.295 0.279
 (0.378) (0.424) (0.397) (0.653) (0.416) (1.257) (0.431)
   X Board composition  -1.833 0.858 0.480 1.392 0.152 0.232
 (1.723) (5.333) (1.428) (5.020) (2.820) (0.988)
ROA- social AL, > AL -0.418 -0.051 -0.374 -0.916 -0.324 -2.125+ -0.503
 (0.346) (0.407) (0.368) (0.630) (0.389) (1.107) (0.359)
   X Board composition  -2.418 0.556 1.358 1.035 4.521+ 1.440
 (1.535) (4.253) (1.355) (4.432) (2.697) (0.921)
 
Log likelihood -87,843.40 -87,782.12 -86,432.04 -86,437.50 -86,437.97 -86,431.73 -87,233.76 -87,231.30
Likelihood ratio test 2399.92** 2436.3** 2437.84** 2426.92** 2425.98** 2438.46** 2438.78** 2443.7**
Degrees of freedom 123 127 132 132 132 132 132 132
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; two-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors below coefficient estimates. 30,469 observations. 
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Table 4: Ordered logit model of source of acquisition target 
  Board composition interaction variable 
Variable Holding 
Shares
Anglo-Saxon 
experience
State 
experience
State-owned 
Bank
Stateness 
factor
Stateness 
score
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age -0.018** -0.016** -0.011** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.012** -0.011**
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size 0.166** 0.123** 0.125** 0.129** 0.134** 0.130** 0.129** 0.124**
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Market to book value 0.159** 0.124** 0.117** 0.126** 0.127** 0.123** 0.115** 0.113**
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Debt to equity -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Free cash flow 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Diversification level -0.016+ -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Cumulative asset experience -0.037** -0.039** -0.037** -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** -0.036** -0.036**
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cumulative minority exper. 0.029** 0.030** 0.028** 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 0.029** 0.029**
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cumulative control exper. 0.035** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.033** 0.033** 0.032** 0.032**
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Proportion state ownership -0.848** -0.800** -0.726** -0.791** -0.776** -0.800** -0.723** -0.709**
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Board composition variable -0.216* 0.165 0.130+ -0.137 -0.118 -0.024
 (0.100) (0.319) (0.076) (0.272) (0.160) (0.057)
ROA- historical AL, < AL 2.524** 2.323** 1.717** 3.582** 2.184** 7.048** 3.589**
 (0.506) (0.616) (0.542) (0.956) (0.545) (1.945) (0.618)
   X Board composition 3.984 24.698** -3.908+ 8.222 -10.821* -4.765**
 (3.053) (8.851) (2.079) (8.111) (4.425) (1.576)
ROA- historical AL, > AL 4.580** 1.968** 3.962** 7.012** 5.545** 11.906** 5.862**
 (0.431) (0.469) (0.460) (0.783) (0.483) (1.324) (0.490)
   X Board composition 17.927** 8.469 -6.219** -27.331** -17.467** -6.601**
 (1.894) (5.502) (1.481) (4.271) (2.924) (1.024)
ROA- social AL, < AL -0.756+ -0.878 -0.259 -1.234 -0.457 -4.181* -1.691**
 (0.459) (0.565) (0.488) (0.868) (0.488) (1.674) (0.552)
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   X Board composition -0.720 -15.756* 1.927 -9.925 7.862* 3.358*
 (2.471) (7.372) (1.812) (7.405) (3.776) (1.332)
ROA- social AL, > AL -4.666** -2.657** -4.032** -5.378** -5.436** -8.045** -4.706**
 (0.460) (0.530) (0.495) (0.824) (0.507) (1.453) (0.501)
   X Board composition -10.216** -5.850 2.163 24.662** 8.724** 2.457*
 (2.143) (5.704) (1.691) (5.715) (3.362) (1.160)
 
Likelihood ratio -27,481.09 -27,350.33 -26,829.94 -26,894.47 -26,884.18 -26,882.22 -27,105.61 -27,090.18
Log likelihood test 2296.66** 2515.02** 2671.04** 2541.98** 2562.56** 2566.48** 2623.36** 2654.22**
Degrees of freedom 123 127 132 132 132 132 132 132
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; two-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors below coefficient estimates. The models contain the same control variables as 
the models of Table 3 including fixed effects for industry and region, but these are not displayed in the table. 28,842 observations 
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Table 5: Ordered logit model of form of acquisition target 
Board composition interaction variable 
Variable Holding 
Shares 
Anglo-Saxon 
experience 
State 
experience
State-owned 
Bank
Stateness 
factor
Stateness 
score
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age 0.004 0.005 0.007+ 0.005 0.006+ 0.005 0.008* 0.008*
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Size 0.041* 0.033+ 0.028 0.036* 0.042* 0.027 0.040* 0.038*
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Market to book value 0.037** 0.024* 0.017 0.025* 0.023+ 0.022+ 0.026* 0.027*
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Debt to equity 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Free cash flow 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Diversification level -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.004
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Cumulative asset exper. -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.010** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008* -0.008*
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cumulative minority exper. -0.020** -0.020** -0.021** -0.020** -0.021** -0.020** -0.021** -0.021**
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cumulative control exper. 0.035** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.032** 0.032**
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Proportion state ownership -0.778** -0.756** -0.722** -0.760** -0.714** -0.765** -0.701** -0.697**
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Board composition variable -0.250+ 0.492 -0.320** 0.260 -0.345 -0.139+
 (0.136) (0.412) (0.107) (0.338) (0.223) (0.080)
ROA- historical AL, < AL -0.513 -0.306 -0.685 -1.254 -0.294 -0.634 -0.753
 (0.779) (0.966) (0.855) (1.373) (0.855) (2.649) (0.857)
   X Board composition  0.068 3.252 2.360 -16.854 0.362 1.362
 (4.572) (10.708) (3.091) (11.253) (6.264) (2.220)
ROA- historical AL, > AL 2.203** 0.658 1.618* 2.226* 2.023** 6.394** 2.145**
 (0.596) (0.702) (0.648) (1.022) (0.677) (1.677) (0.651)
   X Board composition  9.639** 2.131 -0.423 7.448 -11.852** -4.117**
 (2.319) (6.433) (1.916) (8.523) (3.849) (1.352)
ROA- social AL, < AL 0.208 0.008 0.598 0.650 -0.410 -2.482 -0.029
 (0.689) (0.870) (0.746) (1.208) (0.738) (2.195) (0.749)
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   X Board composition  -0.625 -9.052 -1.516 26.872** 6.510 1.307
 (3.397) (9.113) (2.528) (10.385) (5.141) (1.811)
ROA- social AL, > AL -2.801** -1.313+ -1.854** -3.424** -2.372** -10.846** -3.140**
 (0.634) (0.789) (0.694) (1.033) (0.691) (1.831) (0.656)
   X Board composition  -7.816** -23.230** 2.184 -13.975 21.844** 7.968**
 (2.616) (7.060) (2.188) (10.874) (4.537) (1.588)
  
Likelihood ratio -14,638.23 -14,618.24 -14,325.41 -14,323.32 -14,326.81 -14,329.25 -14,467.86 -14,467.57
Log likelihood test 968.7 986.86 1003.6 1007.78 1000.8 995.92 1041.06 1041.64
Degrees of freedom 122 126 131 131 131 131 131 131
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; two-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors below coefficient estimates. The models contain the same control 
variables as the models of Table 3 including fixed effects for industry and region, but these are not displayed in the table. 14,153 observations. 
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Figure 1: Interaction Effects of Stateness Factor 
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Figure 2: Interaction Effects of Stateness Score 
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